Software vulnerabilities are costly. NIST estimates that cost to be $60 billion each year, which includes the costs for developing and distributing software patches and reinstalling infected systems and the lost productivity due to malware and errors.
The problem of software vulnerabilities is not new. What is new and promising is the increasing adoption of cryptography and security mechanisms in common software applications. However, it is difficult to write crypto code correctly.
Surprisingly, the practical task of securing cryptographic implementation is still in its infancy. This status is in sharp contrast with the multi-decade advancement of modern cryptography.
This gap became particularly alarming, after multiple high-profile discoveries of cryptography-related vulnerable code in widely used network libraries and tools (e.g., the lack of authenticated encryption in iMessage, Diffie-Hellman key exchange downgrade vulnerability in TLS, and the exposure of random seeds in Juniper Network).
Our ongoing effort is on cryptographic program analysis (CPA), where we design rigorous static program analysis to detect crypto vulnerabilities in code C programs (IEEE SecDev 2017) and Java programs (ACM CCS 2019).
Our ICSE '18 work on empirical findings from the Stack Overflow forum are interesting. They motivate the need for effective crypto coding assistance. Our CCS '19 work CryptoGuard exposes cryptographic API misuses, such as exposed secrets, predictable random numbers, and vulnerable certificate verification. Running our tool on massive sized (e.g., millions of LoC) on 46 high-impact large-scale Apache projects and 6,181 Android apps generated many security insights. Our findings helped multiple popular Apache projects to harden their code, including Spark, Ranger, and Ofbiz. At the same time our refinements in CryptoGuard reduce false alerts by 76% to 80% in our experiments.